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The Commonwealth Seniors Health Card (CSHC) is a key element of
a suite of benefits for Australia’s ‘self-funded retirees’. Its main
component is a pharmaceutical concession, which is analysed as a form
of public health insurance. The utility gain through risk-pooling is found
to be negligible under conservative assumptions. The deadweight loss
through moral hazard may be considerable. Finally, the CSHC may be
seen as an inequitable transfer, because CSHC holders are a particularly
wealthy population.

this increasing support implies that these people
are not entirely self-funded. The effects of these
policies warrant evaluation, as do their costs.
The Commonwealth Seniors Health Card
(CSHC) is one of the main components of this
policy suite. It provides a price concession for
pharmaceuticals, which can be seen as a public
health insurance policy. It also provides eligibility
for other non-cash benefits as well as cash benefits,
conditional on residency requirements. The aim of
this article is to evaluate the welfare effects of the
CSHC, focusing on the pharmaceutical concession.
I estimate the welfare gain associated with risk
reduction and the welfare loss associated with
moral hazard.2 Equity is considered by evaluating

I Introduction
As structural ageing affects the population of
almost all developed countries (OECD, 2007), the
fiscal sustainability of publicly funded retirement
income systems is being questioned (Holzmann
et al., 2005; Blake & Mayhew, 2006; Whiteford &
Whitehouse, 2006; Australian Government, 2007a).
Australia’s response has included the provision of
financial support for people who save for their
retirement. This includes preferential taxation
treatment for retirement savings as well as direct
benefits to ‘self-funded retirees’.1 Paradoxically,
* I thank Garry Barrett and Peter Saunders for many
useful discussions and suggestions. I acknowledge the
helpful comments made on earlier drafts by Denise
Doiron, Bob Gregory, Ian Walker, the anonymous
referees and participants of the 2008 CAER Summer
Workshop in Health Economics, particularly Barbara
Wolfe. The research was partially supported by the ARC
Grant LP0774950. Any errors of fact or omission are the
responsibility of the author.
JEL classifications: H42, H51, I38, H31
Correspondence: Peter Siminski, School of Economics,
University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522,
Australia. Email: siminski@uow.edu.au

any pension income. (See for example Commonwealth
of Australia, 1999; Department of the Parliamentary
Library, 2001). This population is the subject of the
analysis in this article.
2
The term ‘moral hazard’ is widely used in the
literature on insurance. It often refers to the increased
propensity to take risks, resulting from the incentives
provided by insurance. In the health economics
literature, however, the term is commonly used in a
different sense. It often refers to the increased health
care consumption resulting from the reduced marginal
price of health care characterised by health insurance
(see for example Folland et al., 2007: 166). This is the
sense in which the term is used here.

1
The term ‘self-funded retiree’, now commonplace in
Australian policy discourse, has no formal definition.
However, in typical usage, it excludes anyone who receives
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the relative income and wealth of recipients. Consideration is also given to the altruistic externalities
associated with health care and the applicability
of the chosen approach to public health insurance
more broadly.
The remainder of the article is organised as
follows. Section II provides a detailed description
of the CSHC. It considers changes to its eligibility
rules and the increasingly generous set of benefits
to which holders are entitled. It also provides a
profile of CSHC holders, whose distinguishing
characteristic is wealth. Sections III and IV estimate
the welfare effects of risk reduction and moral
hazard, respectively. Section III finds the welfare
gain through risk reduction to be negligible under
very conservative assumptions and quite general
specifications of the utility function. Even without
the pharmaceutical concession, consumers are already
covered against high levels of pharmaceutical
expenditure, so it is not surprising that the additional
reduction in risk provided by the CSHC is negligible.
Section IV estimates the welfare loss due to moral
hazard. The deadweight loss is found to be substantial, even if a small price elasticity of demand
for pharmaceuticals is assumed. The sensitivity of
the estimates to the assumed parameters is considered
in detail. The assumptions underlying the deadweight loss calculations are of particular importance
in analysing health care and health insurance and
these are discussed in Section V. Section VI concludes.
II The Commonwealth Seniors Health Card
The CSHC was introduced in July 1994. Its
original purpose was to provide pharmaceuticals
at a concessional price to people of age pension
age who met the pension income eligibility test,
but who did not meet other eligibility conditions.
The majority of such people did not meet the
assets test or residency requirements. In April
1997 there were only 37 844 CSHC holders
(Table 1) (Standing Committee on Family and
Community Affairs, 1997). The concessional price
for pharmaceuticals listed on the Pharmaceutical
Benefits Scheme (PBS) was $2.60 per prescription
at the time. Other people eligible for the
concession include pensioners and low income
earners. Consumers who were ineligible for the
pension paid $16.00 per prescription. For both
general and concessional consumers, the price is
reduced after a consumer exceeds a given annual
out-pocket expenditure in a calendar year, as shall
be discussed subsequently.
In January 1999, there was a fundamental
change in the role of the CSHC. The CSHC

© 2009 The Economic Society of Australia
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Table 1
Number of CSHC Holders
April 1997
June 2001
June 2003
June 2004*
June 2005
June 2006
June 2007*

37 844
226 140
282 691
287 326
300 165
310 633
318 278

* It is presumed that these are at June as for the other years,
though this is not stated in the original source.
Source: Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs
(1997) and FaCS/FaCSIA Annual Reports in various years.

income eligibility threshold was no longer linked
to that of the age pension eligibility threshold. It
was almost doubled to $40 000 per annum for
singles and $67 000 for couples. Officially, the 1999
CSHC policy change was designed to ‘encourage
people to save for their own retirement’ (Costello,
1998: 5). The threshold was increased again nominally
in July 2000 and more substantially in July 2001,
to $50 000 for singles and $80 000 for couples
(Australian Government, 2007b: Section 4.10.7.50).
Immediately before the last of these threshold
increases (June 2001), there were 226 140 CSHC
holders (Department of Family and Community
Services, 2003a). Two years after the last increase
(June 2003) there were 282 691 CSHC holders
(Table 1) (Department of Family and Community
Services, 2003b). The exact number of people
who took-up the card as a result of the income
threshold reforms is unknown.3 Recall that the
37 844 CSHC holders in 1997 were all below the
age pension income eligibility threshold. If this
number was to stay constant over time, then perhaps

3
As will be shown below, the income distribution of
CSHC holders is available at one point in time, using
the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) of 2003–
2004. These data could be used to estimate the
proportion of recipients whose income falls between the
old and new thresholds. However, this may be
misleading because of the application of CSHC income
eligibility rules. Applicants meet the CSHC income
eligibility test if their income in the previous financial
year was below the threshold. However, applicants can
also meet the income test on the basis of an estimate of
income in the current financial year, if they can
demonstrate a change in circumstances since the end of
the previous financial year.
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87 per cent of CSHC holders in 2003 had become
eligible due to the increase in the threshold.4 This
is a very rough approximation, but it suggests that
most CSHC holders may have become eligible
due to the reforms.
Prior to September 2001, the PBS concession
was the only benefit of the CSHC. Since then, there
has been a number of additional cash benefits
introduced which are linked to CSHC eligibility.
From September 2001, CSHC holders who meet
residency requirement are also eligible for the
Telephone Allowance. This is a cash benefit initially
worth $72 per year (paid quarterly) for people
who have a telephone connected in their name or
their partner’s name. This has increased incrementally to $85.60 by December 2006. Age pensioners
are also eligible for the Telephone Allowance.
From December 2004, CSHC holders who meet
residency requirements are entitled to the Seniors
Concession Allowance, a cash benefit initially
worth $200 per year (paid in two instalments).
This has increased incrementally to $214 by
December 2006. Age pensioners are not eligible
for this benefit. However, age pensioners are
eligible for the Utilities Allowance and various
concessions from State and Territory governments
for services such as property and water rates, energy
bills, public transport and motor vehicle registration, many of which are not available to CSHC
holders. Indeed the Seniors Concession Allowance
was introduced because of such concessions.
In turn, the Seniors Concession Allowance has
provided eligibility for two ‘one-off’ payments. In
June 2007, a payment of $500 was made to Seniors
Concession Allowees as well as to age pensioners.
In June 2006, a one-off payment of $102.80 was
made to Seniors Concession Allowees. The same
payment was made to age pensioners. Notably,
however, age pensioners who were members of a
couple (not separated due to illness) only received
half of this amount each, while coupled Seniors
Concession Allowees each received the full
amount. Non-concession card holders were not
eligible for these payments. It is also notable that
a similar payment (worth $300) was made in 2001
to age pensioners, but not to CSHC holders.

4
This estimate becomes 86 per cent if it is assumed
that this number increased in proportion with the age
pension age population (taking into account the increase
in the age eligibility threshold for women from 60.5 to
62 years between 1997 and 2003).

JUNE

CSHC holders might also be more likely to be
bulk-billed5 for GP services than non-concessional
patients. In February 2004, the Commonwealth
Government introduced financial incentives for
GPs to bulk-bill concession card holders and children
aged less than 16. However, there does not seem
to be any available data that quantifies the extent
to which CSHC holders are actually bulk-billed.
From March 2004, CSHC holders are entitled
to concessional coverage under the extended
Medicare Safety Net. Under this scheme, 80 per cent
of non-hospital out-of-pocket medical expenses
are reimbursed by the government after such
expenditure exceeds a given threshold. In 2007,
this threshold is $519.50 per year for concession
card holders, and $1039 for non-concession card
holders. Thus the additional concessional coverage
is worth a maximum of 80% × ($1039 – $519.50)
= $415.60 per year per recipient. Data on the
distribution of annual out-of-pocket medical
expenses of CSHC holders are not available, and
so the average value of this concession to CSHC
holders is unknown. However, the average annual
out-of-pocket expenditure by CSHC holders is
estimated to be $257 in 2003–2004, and the proportion exceeding $519.50 is no more than 11 per
cent.6 Furthermore, both concession card holders and
general patients are also eligible for the (original)
Medicare Safety Net. Under this scheme, 100 per
cent of the Medicare Schedule Fee is reimbursed
for patients whose ‘gap’ fees exceed an annual
threshold. The gap is the difference between the

5
Bulk-billing is a billing system which includes no
charge for the patient.
6
Author’s calculations from the 2003–2004 ABS
Household Expenditure Survey Expanded Confidentialised
Unit Record File. Expenditure in this dataset is recorded
on a household basis. Household expenditure is assumed
to be equally distributed between household members.
Respondents are asked to recall expenditure on medical
services over the previous three months. The distribution
of annual expenditure cannot be derived from these data.
The variance of expenditure is likely to be greater for a
short recall period than a long recall period. However,
an upper bound of the proportion of people exceeding
the threshold can be derived by assuming that the 3month recall period is representative of the full year for
each household. Under this assumption, 11.0 per cent of
CSHC holders exceeded the $519.50 threshold. Thus a
maximum of 11.0 per cent of CSHC receive any benefit
from the Medicare Safety Net. Similarly, no more than
8 per cent exceed the $1039 threshold, hence benefiting
from the maximum value of the concession.

© 2009 The Economic Society of Australia
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Table 2
Summary of non-PBS CSHC Benefits per card Holder in 2007

Telephone allowance
Seniors concession allowance
One-off Payment
Additional bulk billing
Medicare safety net (concessional threshold)
Total

Single

Coupled (per person)

$86.20
$214.00
$500.00
Value unknown
Value unknown*
$800.20

$43.10
$214.00
$500.00
Value unknown
Value unknown*
$757.10

* The value is estimated to be no greater than $45.72, but could be considerably less than this. Due to the lack of confidence in this
estimate, it has been excluded from the calculations that follow.

Medicare Schedule Fee and the amount reimbursed by Medicare. The gap is equal to 15 per
cent of the Schedule Fee, although practitioners
are free to charge in excess of the Schedule Fee.
In 2007, the threshold for this scheme is $358.90.
Without access to relevant data, the interaction
between the original and extended Medicare
Safety Nets is difficult to gauge. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the average value of this scheme to CSHC
holders (in excess of its value to-non-concessional
patients) is likely to be small. An upper bound is
calculated as the maximum benefit multiplied by
the maximum proportion of beneficiaries, which
equals $415.60 × 11% = $45.72 The actual value
may be considerably smaller than this.
Table 2 summarises the non-PBS benefits received
by each CSHC card holder in 2007. The total is
$800.20 for singles and $757.10 for each member of
a couple plus the unmeasured values of additional
bulk billing and the concessional threshold in the
Medicare Safety Net. Older people without concession cards are not eligible for any of these benefits.
Age pensioners are eligible for all of these benefits
except for the Seniors Concession Allowance.
The 2003–2004 Household Expenditure Survey
is perhaps the only nationally representative
dataset available which explicitly identifies CSHC
holders. Table 3 shows summary statistics for
CSHC holders, with comparisons to non-CSHC
holders of age pension age and to younger people
(including children). Approximately 10 per cent of
older people were CSHC holders. On average,
CSHC holders were one year younger than nonCSHC holders of age pension age and a slightly
larger percentage (2 per cent) was male. Their
average equivalised current disposable income
was considerably higher ($102 per week) than
that of non-CSHC holders of age pension age, but

© 2009 The Economic Society of Australia

considerably lower ($78) than that of younger
people. CSHC holders are located throughout the
income distribution, although relatively few are in
the top quintile. In comparison, non-CSHC holders
of age pension age are concentrated in the bottom
half of the distribution. While CSHC holders
appear to fare poorly relative to younger people
on these income measures, it is noted that cash
income is not a good metric for comparisons of
living standards between older people and younger
people. This is due to the exclusion of imputed
rental income from owner occupied housing, which
greatly benefits older people relative to younger
people (see Yates, 1991; Saunders & Siminski,
2005). This is reflected in the last row of Table 3,
which shows that 88 per cent of CSHC holders live
in an owner-occupied dwelling without a mortgage,
compared with 77 per cent of non-CSHC holders
of age pension age and just 23 per cent of younger
people.
The distinguishing characteristic of CSHC
holders is wealth. Their net wealth per capita was
$623 898, almost twice that of other older people
and almost four times that of younger people.
CSHC holders are highly concentrated at the top
of the wealth distribution. The majority (59 per
cent) of CSHC holders are in the top decile of the
wealth distribution, while only 6.5 per cent are in
the bottom 60 per cent of the distribution.
III The Welfare Gain of Risk Pooling
Health insurance provides protection against the
financial consequences of adverse health shocks.
It also protects against welfare loss due to poor
health to the extent that lower prices for health
care translate into higher health care consumption.
In this section, I abstract from the effects of such
behavioural responses to price, since they are
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics from HES 2003–2004

Number of people
Sex (% female)
Mean age
Mean equivalised income ($/week)

CSHC
holders

Non-CSHC holders
of age pension age

Younger
people*

264 438
56.1
71.7
493.07

2 312 571
57.8
72.9
390.75

17 011 496
49.0
34.9
570.81

Percentage in each decile of equivalised income
First decile (low)
Second decile
Third decile
Fourth decile
Fifth decile
Sixth decile
Seventh decile
Eighth decile
Ninth decile
Tenth decile (high)
Total

17.5
6.2
8.4
12.3
12.8
10.5
8.2
11.3
5.7
7.0
100.0

18.4
27.3
19.7
10.1
8.2
5.1
3.2
1.9
2.7
3.4
100.0

8.8
7.8
8.9
9.9
10.2
10.6
11.0
11.0
11.0
10.9
100.0

Owner occupied dwelling (outright) (%)
Mean net wealth per capita ($ ’000s)

88.0
623.9

77.1
325.8

22.9
161.2

Percentage in each decile of net personal wealth
First decile (low)
Second decile
Third decile
Fourth decile
Fifth decile
Sixth decile
Seventh decile
Eighth decile
Ninth decile
Tenth decile (high)
Total

0.7
0.5
0.6
2.4
0.8
1.6
9.0
7.7
17.7
59.1
100.0

4.7
5.8
4.5
3.7
7.4
6.9
12.0
15.6
20.7
18.8
100.0

10.9
10.8
10.9
11.0
10.5
10.6
9.7
9.4
8.4
7.7
100.0

Equivalised income is person-weighted current disposable income, equivalised using the ‘modified-OECD’ equivalence scale. The
equivalence scale adjusts for differences in need due to household composition. Person-weighting ensures that all people (including
children) are included in the summary statistics. The method assumes pooling of income within households. The net wealth statistics
assume that wealth is shared equally amongst all members within households. * All people (including children) who are below age
pension age (males < 65 years and females < 63 years).

analysed in detail in the next section. Let I denote
income. Let x and y denote pharmaceutical and
non-pharmaceutical consumption respectively. Let
p denote the price of pharmaceuticals, while the
price of y is normalised to 1. Income is equal to
total consumption, so that I = px + y. Consider a
health state dependent utility function of the
following form:
U = U1( y) + U2(h).

(1)

Where h is health. In this model, health contributes
to utility independently of (non-pharmaceutical)
consumption. The model does not allow for the

possibility that the marginal utility of consumption varies with health status. It is shown in
Appendix 1 that a more general specification,
which allows the marginal utility of consumption
to decrease with sickness, would result in an even
smaller utility gain due to risk pooling. However,
the more restrictive specification is used in the
body of the text as it is analytically tractable.
Let h, in turn, be a function of pharmaceutical
consumption (x) and the exogenous pre-treatment
health status (θ), over which there is uncertainty.
Pharmaceutical consumption is a function of θ
and I. It does not contribute directly to utility.

© 2009 The Economic Society of Australia
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Assume that U1 is the constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA) function. The functional form of
U2 remains unspecified:
U =

y1−ρ
( I − px )1−ρ
+ U 2 ( h) =
+ U 2 ( h) (2)
1− ρ
1− ρ

where ρ is the Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion
parameter. The CRRA utility function assumes
that risk aversion is negatively proportional to
wealth (or consumption) (Pratt, 1964). Many
available estimates of ρ are in respect to utility as
a function of wealth and so are not relevant here
(see Hartley et al., 2006 for a review of such
estimates; and Meyer & Meyer, 2005 for a formal
discussion of the relationship between CRRA
utility functions of wealth and consumption).
Estimates of ρ in respect to utility as a function of
consumption include 4.1 in a study based on
hypothetical gambles over permanent changes to
income (Barsky et al., 1997). That study also
found very little variation in this estimate by
income quintile, supporting the assumption of
CRRA for consumption. There have been several
other studies which exploit savings responses to
interest rates to measure the intertemporal elasticity
of consumption, which in turn is the inverse of ρ.
These estimates for ρ include 2.5 (Engen, 1993;
cited by Engen & Gruber, 2001) and between 2
and 5 (Skinner, 1985). The consistency of these
estimates justify the ‘long line of simulation
literature’ described by Finkelstein and McKnight
(2005) which takes ρ to be 3. In the present study,
I follow Finkelstein and McKnight (2005, 2008)
by assuming that ρ is equal to 3, and testing
sensitivity to values of 1 and 5. It is acknowledged
that all of the estimates for ρ reviewed above are
with respect to the USA. To the author’s knowledge,
corresponding estimates do not exist for Australia.
To implement this approach, it is necessary
to estimate the extent of uncertainty over pretreatment health status or at least over the resulting
pharmaceutical consumption. While x is a random
variable, it may not be completely random. In
particular, health status is likely to be serially
correlated. Several approaches have been used in
related studies to address this issue. In the RAND
Health Insurance Experiment, participants were
asked to predict future health care consumption.
Manning and Marquis (1996) compared these
responses to actual consumption, thus measuring
the extent to which it was predicted. Finkelstein
and McKnight (2008) modelled the distribution of
health care consumption before and after the
introduction of the Medicare scheme in the USA.

© 2009 The Economic Society of Australia
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The data to implement such approaches for
the CSHC are not available. In fact, the annual
distribution of pharmaceutical expenditure is not
readily available for even one point in time for the
population of interest.7 However, this is not a
major limitation. The approach taken here is to
make conservative assumptions over the distribution of out of pocket pharmaceutical expenditure
and the extent of uncertainty over future consumption. Despite these assumptions, the utility
value of the CSHC due to risk-pooling is found to
be negligible. Pharmaceutical consumption is
assumed to be completely random, regardless of
prior health status or other observable characteristics.
This approach will overestimate the uncertainty
over pharmaceutical consumption (and hence the
utility value of risk pooling). Following Siminski
(2008a), the annual number of PBS pharmaceutical
prescriptions consumed is assumed to follow an
overdispersed count data process, with a mean of
33.1. The extent of overdispersion is unknown,
but is parameterised through a Negative Binomial
process (see Cameron & Trivedi, 1998: equation
(3.26) for the density function). Figure 1 shows
three such distributions. The first is the Poisson
distribution, which is a special case of the Negative
Binomial with the overdispersion parameter (α)
equal to zero. This is also almost identical to a
Normal distribution. The other distributions are
Negative Binomial with α set to 0.3, and 1
respectively. When α = 1, the variance of the
Negative Binomial is 34 times larger than that of
the Poisson.
Assume the distribution of the number of
prescriptions purchased is the same under general
and concessional price schedules (the welfare
effect of responses to price are the subject of the
next section). Each of the probability distributions
of prescription counts in Figure 1 corresponds
with a distribution of pharmaceutical expenditure
under general and concessional price schedules,
respectively. For a given person, the probability
distribution of non-pharmaceutical consumption is
7
HES 2003–2004 includes self-reported household
expenditure on prescription medication in a 2-week
period. The distribution of this amount is unlikely to be
a useful proxy for the shape of the annual distribution
for at least two reasons. The variance of expenditure in
2-week recall period is likely to be much greater than
that of annual expenditure. Second, not all prescription
medications are listed on the PBS. Patients would pay
the full cost of any such medications, thereby increasing
the variance further.
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Figure 1
Possible Distributions for Annual Number of PBS Drug Purchases

a function only of PBS concession status. An
illustration of these distributions under both sets
of prices is shown in Figure 2 for a single person.
In this example, the negative binomial distribution
is assumed to have α equal to 0.3. The discontinuity in the distribution under ‘general prices’
occurs at the point where the safety net is
invoked. In the distribution under ‘concession
prices’, expenditure is capped at a maximum of
$274.40 per year, after which all subsequent prescriptions are free to the consumer. In the model
being developed here, the effect of the CSHC is to
replace the ‘general price’ probability distribution
of non-pharmaceutical consumption with the corresponding ‘concession price’ distribution.
For couples, safety net eligibility is based on
combined pharmaceutical consumption. The probability distributions of their non-pharmaceutical
consumption thus differ from those in Figure 2
and they are not shown. The results that follow
differentiate between single and coupled CSHC
holders. It is assumed that each member of a
couple independently faces the same probability
distribution of prescription counts and that income
is shared within the household. The main findings
are unchanged under alternate assumptions (for

example perfectly correlated pharmaceutical consumption and/or no income pooling by couples).
The expected utility (with a CSHC card) is:





E (U c ) = U1 ( y) f1 ( y)dy + U 2 ( h)g(θ )dθ

(3)

where y is non-pharmaceutical consumption, f1
is the probability density function depicted in the
first panel of Figure 2 (or the corresponding
density under different assumptions about
dispersion), g is an unspecified probability density
of pre-treatment health states (θ). The expected
utility without a concession card is given by:





E (U g ) = U1 ( y) f2 ( y)dy + U 2 ( h)g(θ )dθ

(4)

where, f2 is the probability density function
depicted in the second panel of Figure 2 (or the
corresponding distribution under different assumptions about dispersion). The second integral is
identical to that of E(Uc) since no response to
price in pharmaceutical consumption has been
assumed in this section. A rational consumer is
indifferent between possessing a CSHC or receiving
a cash payment M when the utility of each
situation is equal:

© 2009 The Economic Society of Australia
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Figure 2
Probability Distributions for Annual Non-pharmaceutical Consumption by PBS Concession Status – Singles ($’000)
(Annual Income = $40 000; α = 0.3)

U (y + M) f (y)dy + U (h)g(θ )dθ
(5)
= U ( y ) f ( y )dy + U ( h)g(θ )dθ .


1

2

2

1

i

1

i

i

2

Which implies that:

© 2009 The Economic Society of Australia

U (y + M) f (y)dy = U (y) f (y)dy.
1

2

1

1

(6)

With ρ = 3, this becomes:



−



( yi + M )−2
y −2 f1 ( y)
f2 ( y)dy = −
dy.
2
2

(7)
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Table 4
Utility Value of CSHC Due to Risk Reduction (% of
Actuarially Fair Premium)

α
ρ

0 (Poisson)

1
3
5

0.0
0.1
0.2

1
3
5

0.0
0.0
0.0

0.3

1

0.2
0.6
1.1

0.5
1.4
2.4

0.0
0.1
0.1

0.8
1.0
1.3

Singles

Couples

Notes: This table shows the estimated contribution of the CSHC
to utility through risk avoidance, expressed as a percentage of
the actuarially fair premium. It shows various estimates for
singles and couples under different assumptions of α (the extent
of overdispersion in the assumed negative binomial distribution
of annual pharmaceutical counts) and ρ (the Arrow-Pratt relative
risk aversion parameter). It is assumed that future
pharmaceutical consumption is completely unknown as
discussed in the text.

With ρ = 3 and α = 0.3, M is evaluated to be
$582.85 for singles. The actuarially fair insurance
premium is the difference in expected pharmaceutical expenditure (under concessional and
general prices) = E(xpg) – E(xpc) = $579.19. Thus
the contribution to utility associated with risk
reduction is worth $3.66 per year, or 0.6 per cent
of the actuarially fair premium. For couples, M is
estimated to be $887.93 (or $443.96 per person).
This is lower for couples because they are more
likely than singles to reach the safety net threshold
under general prices. The contribution to utility
through risk reduction is also smaller for couples
at just 0.1 per cent of the actuarially fair premium.
This is mainly because couples effectively selfinsure against risk, by pooling their combined
income.8 Table 4 shows the results under various
assumed values for α and ρ. Even under assumptions of high dispersion of the PBS consumption

8
If it is assumed that couples do not pool income, the
value of the concession through risk reduction increases
to 0.5 per cent of the actuarially fair premium. If it is
assumed that pharmaceutical consumption is perfectly
correlated within couples, the value is 0.2 per cent of
the actuarially fair premium, regardless if income is
assumed to be pooled.

JUNE

distribution (α = 1), high risk aversion (ρ = 5) and
completely random future health status, the value
of the CHSC to risk reduction is equal to only
2.4 per cent of the actuarially fair premium value
of the card for singles, and 1.3 per cent for couples.
The actual value is likely to be less than 1 per cent
and is hence negligible.
IV Moral Hazard and Deadweight Loss
In this section, I consider the deadweight loss
(DWL) associated with the PBS component of the
CSHC. DWL is the difference between the social
cost of the CSHC and the minimum cash amount
that rational recipients would be willing to receive
instead of the CSHC. The key assumptions
underlying these calculations are discussed in
detail in the following section and should be
considered when interpreting these results.
The key parameter which influences the results is
the price elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals.
Exploiting the CSHC policy change as a natural
experiment, Siminski (2008a) estimated the price
elasticity to be –0.1 for this population. This value
is adopted here, with sensitivity tested to other
values.
For this exercise, it is assumed that there is no
uncertainty, since uncertainty was addressed in the
previous section. In this model, consumers know
their own health status with certainty for the
immediate accounting period (a calendar year).
For this health status and a given price, there is a
unique quantity of pharmaceuticals consumed,
which maximises the utility of a given consumer.
This consumer’s utility function depends on pharmaceutical consumption and non-pharmaceutical
consumption. In summary, the approach taken is
to derive the Hicksian compensating variation
(HCV) for such a consumer under a number of
different scenarios (Hicks, 1943; Hausman, 1981).
The difference between the cost to government
and the HCV is the DWL component of government
expenditure.
Consider a demand function for pharmaceuticals
for person i. Let the quantity demanded and price of
pharmaceuticals be denoted xi and p, respectively.
Let yi be the quantity demanded of the composite
of all other goods. The price of yi is normalised to
1 and is fixed. Income is denoted Ii. Assume that
the demand function exhibits constant price and
income elasticities. Under these assumptions, the
Marshallian demand function for pharmaceuticals
can be written as:
xi = ci pαi I iδ i

(8)
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where αi and δi are the own-price and income
elasticities of demand for pharmaceuticals, ci is
individual specific and varies with health status
and preferences for pharmaceutical versus non
pharmaceutical consumption, but these are
assumed fixed for the accounting period and are
known with certainty.
Consider the following indirect utility function:
Vi ( p, I i ) =

−ci pαi +1
I 1−δ i
.
+ i
αi + 1
1 − δi

(9)

This utility function corresponds to the demand
function given in (8). For a given utility ui, the
corresponding expenditure function is derived by
solving (9) for I, which is now denoted ei(p, ui):
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎜
⎟

⎡
⎛
c pαi +1 ⎞ ⎤ ⎝ 1−δ i ⎠
ei ( p, ui ) = ⎢(1 − δ i )⎜ ui + i
.
α i + 1 ⎟⎠ ⎥⎥
⎝
⎢⎣
⎦

(10)

This is the minimum expenditure required to
achieve utility ui, given the price p.
Consider the consequences of the abolition of
the CSHC, which would change p from p0 to p1.
The compensation in income which would result
in no change in utility given the price change is
the Hicksian compensating variation:
HCV = ei ( p1, ui ) − e( p0 , ui )
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎜
⎟

⎡
⎛
c pαi +1 ⎞ ⎤ ⎝ 1−δ i ⎠
= ⎢(1 − δ i )⎜ ui + i 1 ⎟ ⎥
α i + 1⎠ ⎥
⎝
⎢⎣
⎦

(11)

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎜
⎟

⎡
⎛
c pαi +1 ⎞ ⎤ ⎝ 1−δ i ⎠
.
− ⎢(1 − δ i )⎜ ui + i 0 ⎟ ⎥
α i + 1⎠ ⎥
⎝
⎢⎣
⎦
Figure 3 shows the nominal price schedules for
general and concessional consumers. For CHSC
holders in 2007, the first 56 PBS medications cost
$4.90 each. Additional prescriptions are free.
For non-concession card holders, the first 43
prescriptions cost an estimated average of $24.56
each.9 Additional prescriptions cost $4.90 each.
The zero price after 56 prescriptions for concession card holders is a complication for the
analysis. Demand is undefined for a zero price in the
constant elasticity demand function. However, it is
noted that the full cost of obtaining a prescription
9
The notional general co-payment amount was
$30.70 in 2007. However, some listed drugs have a
lower price. The ratio of average out-of-pocket price to
the listed co-payment price for CSHC holders was
estimated by Siminski (2008a) and is applied here.
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is not truly zero. There are non-monetary (time)
costs associated with obtaining the medications,
as well as (time and possible monetary) costs
associated with seeing a GP to obtain a prescription.
This unmeasured cost might be small for several
reasons. GP care is free for most Australians,
especially older people (for around 85 per cent of
people aged 65 and over) (Department of Health
and Ageing, 2005). For most medications, GPs can
prescribe several courses (up to six) at one time.
They can also prescribe as many different types of
medication at one time as deemed appropriate.
Furthermore, many people will have needed to see
their GP in any case, for reasons other than to
obtain the prescription. Nevertheless, it is difficult
to estimate the net value of these costs. For the
purpose of the illustration, this unmeasured cost is
assumed to be $1 per prescription. This is applied
throughout the analysis, regardless of the cash
price. Sensitivity of the results is shown for alternative assumptions of $0.50 and $5.
Consider a CSHC holder with α = –0.1, δ = 2,
I = $40 000 and consumption of 30 units of pharmaceuticals (x0 = 30). Substituting these values into
(8), c is equal to 2.2 × 10–8. Evaluating Equation (9) at
these values results in a utility value of –2.5 × 10–5.
If the concession was removed (if p is increased
to p1), what would be the compensation required
to maintain utility at the same level? Substituting
into Equation (11), the compensating variation is
evaluated to be $547. This consumer would be
indifferent between a health concession card and a
cash benefit of $547.
Now consider the cost to government of the
CSHC subsidy. At p = $25.56, x = 25.91 (from
Equation (8)), which is the component of consumption not induced by the CSHC. For each of
these 25.91 prescriptions, the cost to government
is equal to the difference between the concessional
and general PBS prices, which is $24.56 – $4.90
= $19.66. An additional 30 – 25.91 = 4.09 prescriptions were induced by the price change (moral
hazard). In the absence of the CSHC, these would
not have been consumed at all. For these 4.09
prescriptions, the unit cost to government is
greater than for each of the original 25.91. It is
equal to the full government contribution of these
drugs. For concession card holders this is estimated
to be $32.10 In total, the cost to government of the
10
This is equal to the total government contribution
to PBS expenditure for concession card holders divided
by the number of prescriptions. Corresponding data are
not available for the subset of CSHC cardholders.
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Figure 3
Nonlinear Concessional and General Price Schedules, 2007

CSHC for this consumer is equal to 25.91 ×
($24.56–$4.90) + 4.09 × 32 = $640. The DWL is
the difference between HCV and government
cost = $94, or 15 per cent of its cost.
The above example is a special case in a more
general situation, characterised by a nonlinear
price schedule (Figure 3). The quantity demanded
in the example above is to the left of the discontinuities in both price schedules (x0 < 43). This
quantity and the associated marginal price are
labelled as ‘a’ in Figure 3. Quantity demanded
and the marginal price in the counterfactual (general PBS prices) is labelled ‘A’. ‘A’ is also the left
of the discontinuities whenever x0 < 43, since the
marginal price in the general schedule is greater
than or equal to the concession price at all levels of
consumption. Let ‘Scenario 1’ refer to the situation
where x0 < 43.
In Scenario 2, x0 is between the price discontinuities in the two price schedules (43 < x0 < 56
prescriptions in the year, labelled ‘b’). To calculate
the corresponding HCV, it is necessary to calculate
utility under the counterfactual, which is the
general price schedule. To do so, one must confront
the issues posed by the nonlinear price schedule.
The optimal consumption level in the counterfactual
(x1) might also lie between the discontinuities
(denoted ‘B’). However, the consumer may derive
higher utility from a lower level of pharmaceutical

consumption, x < 43, given the higher price of
each of the first 43 prescriptions.
Nonlinear price schedules pose considerable
difficulties for the analysis of health care demand
(Keeler et al., 1977). However, under the assumptions
outlined above, the consumer knows their health
status for the accounting period with certainty.
This consumer can thus choose an optimal level of
consumption for the entire year at the beginning
of the period. If they choose a point to the left of
the discontinuity (x1 < 43), the associated utility
and HCV can be calculated using the same techniques as Scenario 1, with price equal to $25.46.
If the optimum consumption level is to the right
of the discontinuity (x1 > 43) they will face an
‘effective price’ of $5.90 per prescription. This
‘effective price’ is relevant to every prescription
considered for purchase during the year, since the
consumer knows with certainty that an additional
prescription purchase will result in an additional
expenditure of only $5.90 for the year. The actual
expenditure on pharmaceuticals, however, is
greater than this, since the cost of pharmaceuticals
is $25.46–$5.90 higher for the first 43 prescriptions.
The effect of this on consumption and utility is a
pure income effect, equal to a reduction in income
equal to ($25.46–$5.90) × 43 prescriptions =
$845. Therefore, if the consumer chooses a consumption level greater than 43 prescriptions in
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Table 5
HCV ($ Per Person Per Year) and DWL (% of Government Cost) by Consumption Level and Assumed Price Loading
Average across all x0s, negative binomial distribution:
mean = 33.1, overdispersion =

x0
30
HCV ($ per person per year)
Price loading
$0.50
544
$1
547
$5
561
DWL (% of government cost)
Price loading
$0.50
15.4
$1
14.6
$5
10.7

50

80

0

0.3

1

0

Singles

0.3

1

Couples

845
845
845

893
908
934

601
604
619

537
547
559

458
467
479

814
861
881

815
842
863

734
755
775

7.3
7.3
7.3

39.3
33.6
19.7

15.2
14.4
10.5

21.1
17.7
11.8

27.4
22.9
14.4

36.9
27.4
14.5

33.0
26.1
14.4

33.5
27.2
15.3

Notes: HCV is (Hicksian) compensating variation. DWL is deadweight loss.

the counterfactual, the HCV is exactly equal to
$845. To summarise, pharmaceutical consumption
in the counterfactual will be to the left of the
price discontinuity (x1 < 43 prescriptions) if the
associated utility is greater than consumption
above the discontinuity. In other words, if V(25.46,
40 000) > V(5.9, 40 000–845). The cost to government and DWL are calculated using the same
methods as Scenario 1.
To illustrate, take a consumer with the same
parameters as in the first example, with the exception that he consumes 50 units of pharmaceuticals
(x0 = 50). From (8), c is equal to 3.7 × 10–8. In the
counterfactual, utility is higher if the consumer
purchases more than 43 prescriptions, as V(5.9,
40 000–845) = –2.57 × 10–5 > V(25.46, 40 000) =
–2.58 × 10–5. The optimal x1 = 47.9. HCV is evaluated
to be $845. The cost to government of the CSHC
for this consumer is equal to 43 × ($24.56–$4.90)
+ 2.1 × 32 = $913. The DWL is $67, or just 7 per
cent of its cost to government.
This is a much smaller DWL than in Scenario 1.
This is because the ‘effective price’ for concession
cardholders is the same as that of non-card holders.
The DWL is driven solely through an income
effect. However, if x0 is slightly lower (48 units),
a much larger DWL is calculated. In this case, the
optimum consumption in the counterfactual is to
the left of the price discontinuity (x < 43). It is in
fact 41.5 prescriptions. The associated DWL is
$143, or 14 per cent of the cost to government. It
is driven by both income and price effects.
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In Scenario 3, x0 > 56 (denoted ‘c’ in Figure 3).
Consider a consumer with the same parameters as
in the first two scenarios, with the exception that
he consumes 80 units of pharmaceuticals (x0 = 80).
Since x0 > 56, the nominal marginal price is
assumed to be $1 per prescription as discussed
above. To account for the income effect associated
with paying $5.90 for each of the first 56 prescriptions, income is effectively reduced by
($5.90–$1) × 56 = $274.40. From (8), c = 5.1 × 10–8.
In the counterfactual, utility is maximised with
x1 = 65.1 prescriptions. HCV is evaluated to be
$908. The cost to government of the CSHC for
this consumer is equal to $1367. The DWL is
$459, or 34 per cent of its cost to government. If
the assumed additional price of pharmaceuticals is
increased to $5, the DWL falls to 20 per cent of
the government cost. If it is assumed to be 50 c,
the DWL increases to 39 per cent. Regardless of the
choice of this parameter, the DWL is highest in
Scenario 3.
The left panel of Table 5 summarises the results
for the three illustrative consumption levels and
the assumed price loading per prescription (α and
δ are fixed at –0.1 and 2, respectively). The value
of the card to the recipient clearly depends on the
consumption level, with high consumers benefiting more than low consumers. DWL also varies
considerably at the different levels of consumption,
being highest for high consumers and lowest for
those who consume 50 prescriptions. The estimated
HCV is not particularly sensitive to the assumed
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Table 6
HCV ($ Per Person Per Year) and DWL (% of Government Cost) by Price Elasticity of Demand for Pharmaceuticals
Average across all x0s, negative binomial distribution:
mean = 33.1, overdispersion =

x0
30
HCV ($ per person per year)
Price elasticity
0
599
–0.1
547
–0.3
458
DWL (% of government cost)
Price elasticity
0
–1.5
–0.1
14.6
–0.3
36.5

50

80

0

0.3

1

0

Singles

0.3

1

Couples

845
845
769

948
908
481

659
604
506

583
547
424

497
467
356

892
861
364

880
842
558

795
755
554

7.3
7.3
36.0

7.5
33.6
78.2

–1.2
14.4
36.4

1.9
17.7
48.3

3.5
22.9
55.3

3.5
27.4
79.9

3.2
26.1
66.5

3.0
27.2
62.5

Notes: HCV is (Hicksian) compensating variation. DWL is deadweight loss.

price loading due to unobserved costs. However,
the estimated DWL is sensitive to the price loading, particularly at the top of the distribution
(where pharmaceuticals are nominally free).
The middle and right panels of Table 5 shows
the average HCV and DWL across the assumed
distributions of consumption for singles and
couples, respectively. As before, the assumed
value of the overdispersion parameter is 0.3, and
consumption is assumed to be uncorrelated between
members of couples. The preferred estimate for the
average HCV of the PBS component of the CSHC
is $547 for singles and $842 for couples ($421
per coupled person). As in the previous exercise,
above, this estimate for coupled people is lower
than for singles because couples are more likely
to reach the safety net threshold under general
prices than singles. The estimates are neither
particularly sensitive to the assumed overdispersion,
nor to the assumed price loading. The DWL percentages in the middle and right panels are the
percentage of total government expenditure that is
DWL (rather than the average of DWL percentages
across the distribution). In the preferred estimate
for singles, the DWL is equal 17.7 per cent of
government expenditure, but this is sensitive to
the assumed overdispersion and price loading. The
estimated DWL percentage is higher for couples
than for singles, at 26.1 per cent in the preferred
model. For couples, the DWL estimate is much
less sensitive to the assumed overdispersion, but
remains sensitive to the price loading.

Table 6 shows the sensitivity of results to the
price elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals
(δ is fixed at 2 and the price loading is $1). The
value of the card to the recipient does not vary
greatly with price elasticity. The estimated cost to
government of the card varies far more with this
parameter. Thus the share of government expenditure that is DWL also varies considerably.
Table 7 shows the sensitivity of results to the
income elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals
(α is fixed at –0.1 and the price loading is $1).
Neither the HCV nor the DWL is sensitive to
income elasticity.
The results are also insensitive to the assumed
income of the consumer. For example, the HCV
varies by just $2 between I = $30 000 and
I = $50 000 for singles. The corresponding variation
in DWL is 0.4 per cent.
The above analysis has assumed a constant
elasticity demand function. This appears to be the
only specification flexible enough to impose the
same price elasticity for both of the discrete price
changes that characterise the nonlinear price
schedules under consideration. As an example,
consider a log linear demand function, commonly
used in studies of health care utilisation:
ln x = a + β1p + β2I.

(12)

Consider the discrete price change from $5.90
per prescription to $25.56 per prescription. For
the (arc) price elasticity to equal –0.1 in this
demand function, β1 must equal –0.0064.
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Table 7
HCV ($ Per Person Per Year) and DWL (% of Government Cost) by Income Elasticity of Demand for Pharmaceuticals
Average across all x0s, negative binomial distribution:
mean = 33.1, overdispersion =

x0
30
HCV ($ per person per year)
Income elasticity
0.5
541
2
547
5
558
DWL (% of government cost)
Income elasticity
0.5
15.5
2
14.6
5
12.8

50

80

0

0.3

1

0

Singles

0.3

1

Couples

845
845
845

918
908
890

597
604
618

543
547
554

467
467
469

864
861
854

844
842
839

756
755
752

2.0
7.3
16.1

30.9
33.6
38.3

15.3
14.4
12.4

17.0
17.7
18.7

21.5
22.9
25.2

26.1
27.4
30.0

24.9
26.1
28.4

26.1
27.2
29.4

Notes: HCV is (Hicksian) compensating variation. DWL is deadweight loss.

However, to impose the same price elasticity for a
change from $1 to $5.90, β1 must be much larger
(– 0.0290). Thus it is impossible to implement the
above approach with a log linear demand function
that is consistent across all consumption levels.11
To summarise, the average HCV of the PBS
concession for CSHC holders is estimated to be
$547 for singles and $842 for couples. This
estimate is not greatly sensitive to variations in
any of the assumed parameters. The deadweight
loss of the concession is estimated to equal
17.7 per cent of the cost to government for singles
and 26.6 per cent for couples. The DWL estimate is
sensitive to the assumed price elasticity of demand,
the assumed price loading and, for singles, the
assumed overdispersion in the distribution of consumption. Regardless of the assumed parameters,
the DWL percentage is greater for couples than
for singles, which reflects their higher likelihood
of surpassing the concession safety net threshold.
The concession provides no insurance value
through risk pooling. However, there is likely to
be considerable variation between individuals
11
If, however, each price change is considered in
isolation with different log-linear demand functions,
corresponding estimates can be generated. This produces
similar estimates of HCV (3–4 per cent higher than the
preferred approach at all consumption levels) and
slightly smaller estimates of DWL (12–25 per cent
smaller). Nevertheless, the validity of such an approach
is questionable.
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around the average value of the concession. This
variation is primarily due to differences in PBS
consumption levels, which reflect preferences
over pharmaceutical versus non-pharmaceutical
consumption. These, in turn, will be partially a
function of health status.
V Interpreting ‘Deadweight Loss’
The deadweight loss estimated in the previous
section results directly from consumers’ responsiveness to pharmaceutical prices. Whether the higher
consumption associated with lower prices can be
interpreted to reduce welfare rests on several
assumptions, which can be problematic in the
analysis of health care in general (see Rice, 1998
for a detailed critical introduction to these issues).
Perhaps some of these assumptions are more
likely to hold for the CSHC population than for
other population groups who are more responsive
to price. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that all of
these assumptions hold for all CSHC holders, and
the effect of this on welfare is difficult to quantify.
Thus the estimated welfare loss associated with
moral hazard must be considered in light of the
unmeasured consequences of possible violations
of the assumptions that are listed below.
The first set of assumptions concerns revealed
preferences. Traditional demand theory assumes
that consumers will respond to a price change in a
way which maximises their individual wellbeing.
This requires that consumers be perfectly
informed of the health consequences of changing
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the quantity of their pharmaceutical consumption.
They must also be able to weigh up the effect of
any such health consequences against the utility
from consumption of other commodities. Finally,
behaviour is assumed to be motivated by personal
wellbeing, rather than a broader concern over the
consequences of ones actions on others (see especially Sen, 1973 for a discussion of this last point).
Even if consumers are well-informed, rational
and self-interested, a reduction in pharmaceutical
consumption may translate into higher consumption
of other forms of health care which are also subsidised by government. This may result in more
expensive treatment, such as emergency hospital
treatment, for instance (see Newhouse, 2006 for a
review of evidence to this effect; and especially
Tamblyn et al., 2001 in relation to pharmaceutical
subsidies for older people).
Finally, the deadweight loss calculations do not
account for the altruistic externalities that characterise health care markets (Thurow, 1974; Hall,
2001). Altruistic externalities are associated with
what Tobin (1970) calls ‘specific egalitarianism’.
People are generally less willing to tolerate
inequality of access to health care than to other
commodities. Thus the health (and health care) of
a given person may enter the utility functions of
others. However, this may be a minor issue in the
case of the CSHC. CSHC holders have been found
to be quite unresponsive to a pharmaceutical price
change. The card may have little if any effect on
their health. Thus externalities associated with
their health status are likely to be small. Similarly,
the utility gain from the altruism of subsidising
the consumption of this wealthy population may
be smaller than that gained through supporting
poorer groups.
VI Conclusion
This article has analysed the welfare implications of the Commonwealth Seniors Health Card,
focusing on the pharmaceutical concession which
the card provides. Its main feature is a pair of
models which estimate the welfare gain of risk
pooling and the welfare loss of moral hazard,
respectively. I find that the welfare gain through
risk reduction is negligible, whereas the welfare
loss through moral hazard may be substantial. The
deadweight loss of the concession is estimated to
equal 18 per cent of the cost to government
incurred on singles and 26 per cent for couples.
This is despite a relatively small estimated price
elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals for this
population (– 0.1). While the deadweight loss
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estimates are sensitive to the assumed parameters,
most estimates exceed 10 per cent for singles and
15 per cent for couples.
These results must be considered in the context
of the assumptions discussed in section V, which
demonstrates the difficulties involved in analysing
the welfare implications of health care programs.
Some of these assumptions will unquestionably be
violated to some extent and it has not been possible
to quantify the implications of these violations.
However, the extent of these violations may be less
severe given the wealth of the CSHC population
and their apparently small price elasticity of
demand. These assumptions deserve even more
consideration in analyses of health care programs
that cover populations that are poorer or more
responsive to price.
If it is accepted that the deadweight loss of the
CSHC pharmaceutical concession represents
welfare loss, a cash transfer may be a more efficient
use of resources. On the other hand, the concession
has greater value for people with higher PBS
consumption. To the extent that higher PBS consumption reflects poorer health, the concession is
perhaps more equitable than the equivalent cash
transfer. However, CSHC holders are a particularly
wealthy population and so the CSHC may be
regarded as an inequitable transfer. If so, social
welfare may be improved by redirecting resources
towards programs that are more efficient and/or
more equitable than the CSHC.
Finally, it is noted that the CSHC may elicit
behavioural responses in the realms of saving and
labour supply, which are additional considerations
for analyses of its welfare implications. Indeed,
the CSHC is intended to encourage people to save
for retirement. Whether the card has had such an
effect has not been established, although Siminski
(2008b) suggests that while the CSHC creates
incentives for some people to save for retirement,
it may have the opposite effect on others.
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Appendix
Section III estimates the welfare gain of the
CSHC due to risk pooling. It uses a health statedependent utility function which does not allow
the marginal utility of consumption to vary with
health status. There is some evidence that the
marginal utility of consumption decreases with
sickness (increases with health) (e.g. Viscusi &
Evans, 1990; Finkelstein et al., 2008). This is not
a limitation to the analysis if pharmaceutical
consumption completely restores full health, but
this is unrealistic. This appendix outlines the
implications of relaxing this assumption. Specifically, I show that the value of risk-avoidance is
even smaller if the marginal utility of consumption
decreases with sickness.
Equation (6) in the body of the text states that a
consumer is indifferent between a cash transfer of
M and a pharmaceutical concession. Here, the
analysis is simplified by assuming only two health
states, good and bad, which have probabilities of
g and b, respectively. The bad health state elicits
consumption of x pharmaceuticals at a price of p.
The good health state requires no pharmaceutical
consumption. The nonlinear price concession of
the CSHC is replaced by a pure subsidy that is
equal to (1 – r) × 100% of general out of pocket
expenditure (r is the rate of co-insurance). Finally,
the marginal utility of consumption in the bad
health state is equal to γ times the marginal utility
of consumption in the good state. Thus marginal
utility of consumption is lower in poor health
when γ < 1. With these modifications, an equation
that is equivalent to Equation (6) is:
gU1(I + M) + bγ U1(I – px + M)
= gU1(I) + bγ U1(I – rpx).

(A1)

Let the utility of non-pharmaceutical consumption be a CRRA function, where ρ can take any
value.
(1 + M )1−ρ
( I − px + M )1−ρ
+ bγ
1− ρ
1− ρ
(A2)
I 1−ρ
( I − rpx )1−ρ
=g
+ bγ
.
1− ρ
1− ρ
It will be shown that dM/dγ > 0 in general. This
implies that a lower marginal utility of
consumption in poor health results in a lower cash
equivalent value of the subsidy. Furthermore, the
g

JUNE

expected government expenditure on the subsidy
is equal to b(1 – r)x regardless of γ . It follows
that the welfare gain of the subsidy due to risk
reduction is also lower under the assumption of
lower marginal utility of consumption in poor
health. To find dM/dγ, Equation (A2) is implicitly
differentiated:
dM
+
dγ
⎡ ( I − px + M )1−ρ
dM ⎤
b⎢
+ γ ( I − px + M )− ρ
ρ
1
dγ ⎥⎦
–
⎣
1− ρ
(1 − r px )
=b
.
1− ρ
(A3)

g( I + M )− ρ

Make dM/dγ the subject:
dM (1 − ρ )−1 b[(I − rpx )1−ρ − ( I − px + M )1−ρ ]
=
.
dγ
g( I + M )− ρ + bγ ( I − px + M )− ρ
(A4)
Note that g, I, M, b, γ are all ≥ 0. Also, I > px as
long as pharmaceutical consumption does not exceed
income. Therefore the denominator of Equation
(A4) is positive, and dM/dγ has the same sign as:
(1 – ρ)–1[(I – rpx)1–ρ – (I – px + M)1–ρ]

(A5)

when ρ > 1, (1–ρ) < 0 and when ρ < 1, (1 – ρ) > 0.
The second term of Equation (A5) is negative
when:
–1

(I – rpx)1–ρ < (I – px + M)1–ρ.

–1

(A6)

When ρ > 1, Equation (A6) implies: (I – rpx)
< (I – px + M) which simplifies to: M < px(1 – r)
Similarly, the second term of Equation (A5) is
positive when ρ < 1 and M < px(1 – r) Therefore,
from Equation (A5), dM/dγ > 0 if M < px(1 – r)
regardless of the value of ρ. To see if this inequality holds, consider the expected utility in the left
hand side of Equation (A1). If the transfer (M) is
equal to px(1 – r) , expected utility is:
gU(I + px[1 – r]) + bγ U(I – rpx)

(A7)

but this is greater than the right hand side of
Equation (A1), since px > 0 and r < 1. Therefore,
for the equality in (A1) to hold, the transfer (M)
must be smaller, so that M < px(1 – r) must hold
in general. Therefore, dM/dγ > 0.
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